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In artificial intelligence, multi agent systems constitute an interesting typology of society modeling,
and have in this regard vast fields of application, which extend to the human sciences. Logic is often
used to model such kind of systems as it is easier to verify the explainability and validation, so for this
reason we have tried to manage agents’ memory extending a previous work by inserting the concept
of time.
1 Introduction
Memory in an agent system is a process of reasoning: it is the learning process of strengthening a concept.
The interaction between an agent and the environment can play an important role in constructing its
memory and may affect its future behaviour. In fact, through memory an agent is potentially able to
recall and to learn from experiences so that its beliefs and its future course of action are grounded in
these experiences. In computational logic, [2] introduces DLEK (Dynamic Logic of Explicit beliefs and
Knowledge) as a logical formalization of the short-term and long-term memory. The underlying idea is
to represent reasoning about the formation of beliefs through perception and inference in non-omniscient
resource-bounded agents. DLEK has however no notion of time, while agents’ actual perceptions are
inherently timed and so are many of the inferences drawn from such perceptions. In this paper we
present an extension of LEK/DLEK to T-LEK/T-DLEK (“Timed LEK” and “Timed DLEK”) obtained
by introducing a special function which associates to each belief the arrival time and controls timed
inferences. Through this function it is easier to keep the evolution of the surrounding world under
control and the representation is more complete. This abstract is an evolution version of [3], where we
have introduced explicit time instants and time intervals in formulas, and it is extracted from [4].
2 T-LEK and T-DLEK
As in [2], our logic consists of two different components: a static component, called T-LEK, which
is mix between an Epistemic Logic and Metric Temporal Logic, and a dynamic component, called T-
DLEK, which extends the static one with mental operations, which are vary important for “controlling”
beliefs (adds new belief, update belief, etc).
2.1 Syntax
In our scenario we fix Atm = {p(t1, t2),q(t3, t4), ... ,h(ti, t j)} where ti 6 t j and p,q,h are predicates, that
can be equal or not. Moreover p(t1, t2) stands for “p is true from the time instant t1 to t2” with t1, t2 ∈ N
(Temporal Representation of the external world); as a special case we can have p(t1, t1) which stands
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for “p is true in the time instant t1”. Obviously we can have predicates with more terms than only two
but in that case we fix that the first two must be those that identify the time duration of the belief (i.e.
open(1,3,door) which means “the agent knows that the door is open from time 1 to time 3”). Instead
in the previous work [3] we considered atoms of the form pI with I = [t1, t2], which are the conjunction
pt1 ∧ pt1+1 ∧ ·· · ∧ pt2 and also pt stand for pIt with It = [t, t]; we have decided to change approach
because pI is too detached from propositional logic.
Below is the definition of the formulas of the language LT-LEK , with a slight abuse, in this grammar
we use I as terminal symbol standing for time intervals (possibly specified through arithmetic expres-
sions, as said earlier):
ϕ ,ψ := p(t1, t2) | ¬ϕ | I ϕ | Bϕ | Kϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | ϕ → ψ
Other Boolean connectives ⊤, ⊥, ↔ are defined from ¬ and ∧ as usual. In the formula I Φ the MTL
Interval “always” operator is applied to a formula; I is a “time-interval” which is a closed finite interval
[t, l] or an infinite interval [t,∞) (considered open on the upper bound), for any expressions/values t, l
such that 0 ≤ t ≤ l and [0,∞) will sometimes be written simply as . The operator B is intended to
denote belief and the operator K to denote knowledge. More precisely, B identifies beliefs present in the
working memory, instead K identifies what rules present in the background knowledge.
Terms/atoms/formulas as defined so far are ground, namely there are no variables occurring therein.
We introduce variables and use them in formulas in a restricted manner, as usual for example in an-
swer set programming. Variables can occur in formulas in any place; constants can occur and are in-
tended as place holders for elements of the Herbrand universe. More specifically, a ground instance of
a term/atom/formula involving variables is obtained by uniformly substituting ground terms to all vari-
ables (grounding step), with the restriction that any variable occurring in an arithmetic expression (i.e.,
specifying a time instant) can be replaced by a (ground) arithmetic expressions only. Consequently, a
non-ground term/atom/formula represents the possibly infinite set of its ground instances, namely, its
grounding. Notice that the rational of considering ground formulas is that they represent perceptions
(either new or already recorded in agent’s memory) coming in general from the external world (we say
“in general” as, in fact, in some of the aforementioned agent-oriented frameworks perceptions can also
result from internal events, i.e., from an agent’s observations of its own internal activities). As it is
customary in logic programming, variable symbols are indicated with an initial uppercase letter whereas
constants/functions/predicates symbols are indicated with an initial lowercase letter.
The language LT-DLEK of Temporalized DLEK (T-DLEK) is obtained by augmenting LT−LEK with
the expression [α ]ψ , where α denotes a mental operation and ψ is a ground formula. The mental
operations that we consider are essentially the same as in [2]:
• +ϕ , where ϕ is a ground formula of the form p(t1, t2) or ¬p(t1, t2): the mental operation that
serves to form a new belief from a perception ϕ . A perception may become a belief whenever an
agent becomes “aware” of the perception and takes it into explicit consideration. Notice that ϕ
may be a negated atom.
• ∩(ϕ ,ψ): believing both ϕ and ψ , an agent starts believing their conjunction.
• ⊢(ϕ ,ψ), where ψ is a ground atom, say p(t1, t2): an agent, believing that ϕ is true and having
in its long-term memory that ϕ implies ψ (in some suitable time interval including [t1, t2]), starts
believing that p(t1, t2) is true.
• ⊣(ϕ ,ψ) where ϕ and ψ are ground atoms, say p(t1, t2) and q(t3, t4) respectively: an agent, believ-
ing p(t1, t2) and having in the long-term memory that p(t1, t2) implies ¬q(t3, t4), removes the timed
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belief q(t3, t4) if the intervals match. Notice that, should q be believed in a wider interval I such
that [t1, t2] ⊆ I, the belief q(., .) is removed concerning intervals [t1, t2] and [t3, t4], but it is left for
the remaining sub-intervals (so, its is “restructured”).
The last mental operation, which is a sort of “update” or “restructuring operator”, substitutes −ϕ ([2]),
that instead represents arbitrary “forgetting”, i.e., removing a belief from the short-term memory. In fact
in [2] there are +ϕ , −ϕ , ⊢(ϕ ,ψ) and ⊣(ϕ ,ψ).
Example 1: We propose a small example to illustrate the form and the role of rules in the working
memory and in the long-term memory. If at time t=2 it is starting raining, in the agent’s working mem-
ory there will be the following belief: B(raining(2,2)). And if we have in the background knowledge
K(rain(t1, t2) → take(t1, t2,umbrella)) and 2 ∈ [t1, t2] then the agent can infer B(take(2,2,umbrella)),
which is a new belief stored in the working memory. And if we have also K(rain(t1, t2)∧
take(t1, t2,umbrella) → go(t1 + 1,∞,shops)) than the agent can infer B(go(3,∞,shops)) which means
that after getting the umbrella the agent can go around the shops.
Example 2: An example of a non-ground T-LEK formula is:
K([t1,t2](enrollment(T,T)) →[t1,t2]([T,T+14]send payment(T1,T1)))
where we suppose that an agent knows that it is possible to enroll in the university in the period [t1, t2] and
that, after the enrollment, the payment must be sent within fourteen days (still staying within the interval
[t1, t2]). Since, by the restrictions on formulas stated earlier, it must be the case that T1 ∈ [T,T +14] and
both T , T + 14 must be in [t1, t2], only a finite set of ground instances of this formula can be formed
by substituting natural numbers to the variables T,T1 (specifically, the maximum number of ground
instances is t2− t1− 14+ 1 assuming to pay on the last day t2). In case one would consider the more
general formula:
K([t1,t2](enrollment(T,T,X)) →[t1,t2]([T,T+14]send payment(T1,T1,X)))
where X represents a student of that university, i.e., student(., .,X) holds for some ground instance of X ,
then the set of ground instances would grow, as a different instance should be generated for each student
(i.e., for each ground term replacing X ). In practice, however, ground instances need not to be formed a
priori, but rather they can be generated upon need when applying a rule; in the example, just one ground
instance should be generated when some student intends to enroll in that university at a certain time
T = tˆ.
2.2 Semantics
Semantics of DLEK and T-DLEK are both based on a setW of worlds. In both DLEK and T-DLEK we
have the valuation function: V :W → 2Atm. Also we define the “time” function T that associates to each
formula the time interval in which this formula is true and operates as follows:
• T (p(t1, t2)) = [t1, t2], which stands for “p is true in the time interval [t1, t2]” where t1, t2 ∈ N; as
a special case we have T (p(t1, t1)) = t1, which stands for “p is true in the time instant t1” where
t1 ∈ N (time instant);
• T (¬p(t1, t2)) = T (p(t1, t2)), which stands for “p is not true in the time interval [t1, t2]” where
t1, t2 ∈N;
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• T (ϕ op ψ) = T (ϕ)
⊎
T (ψ) with op ∈ {∨,∧,→}, which means the unique smallest interval in-
cluding both T (ϕ) and T (ψ);
• T (Bϕ) = T (ϕ);
• T (Kϕ) = T (ϕ);
• T (Iϕ) = I where I is a time interval in N;
• T ([α ]ϕ) there are different cases depends on which kind of mental operations we applied:
1. T (+ϕ) = T (ϕ);
2. T (∩(ϕ ,ψ)) = T (ϕ)
⊎
T (ψ);
3. T (⊢(ϕ ,ψ)) = T (ψ);
4. T (⊣(ϕ ,ψ)) returns the restored interval where ψ is true.
For a world w, let t1 be the minimum time instant of T (p(t1, t1)) where p(t1, t1) ∈ V (w) and let t2 be
the supremum time instant (we can have t2 = ∞) among the atoms in V (w). Then, whenever useful, we
denote w as wI where I = [t1, t2], which identifies the world in a given interval.
The notion of LEK/T-LEK model does not consider mental operations, discussed later, and is intro-
duced by the following definition.
Definition 2.1 A T-LEK model is a tuple M = 〈W ;N;R;V ;T 〉 where:
• W is the set of worlds;
• V :W → 2Atm valuation function;
• T “time” function;
• R ⊆W×W is the accessibility relation, required to be an equivalence relation so as to model
omniscience in the background knowledge s.t. R(w) = {v ∈W | wIR vI} called epistemic state of
the agent in wI , which indicates all the situations that the agent considers possible in the world
wI or, equivalently any situation the agent can retrieve from long-term memory based on what it
knows in world wI;
• N :W → 22
W
is a “neighbourhood” function, ∀w ∈W, N(w) defines, in terms of sets of worlds,
what the agent is allowed to explicitly believe in the world wI; ∀wI,vI ∈W, and X ⊆W:
1. if X ∈ N(wI), then X ⊆ R(wI): each element of the neighbourhood is a set composed of
reachable worlds;
2. if wIR vI , then N(wI) ⊆ N(vI): if the world vI is compliant with the epistemic state of world
wI , then the agent in the world wI should have a subset of beliefs of the world vI .
A preliminary definition before the Truth conditions : letM = 〈W ;N;R;V ;T 〉 a T-LEKmodel. Given
a formula ϕ , for every wI ∈W , we define
‖ ϕ ‖MwI= {vI ∈W |M,vI |= ϕ}∩R(wI).
Truth conditions for T-DLEK formulas are defined inductively as follows:
• M,wI |= p(t1, t2) iff p(t1, t2) ∈V (wI) and T (p(t1, t2))⊆ I;
• M,wI |= ¬ϕ iff M,wI 2 ϕ and T (¬ϕ)⊆ I;
• M,wI |= ϕ ∧ψ iff M,wI |= ϕ and M,wI |= ψ with T (ϕ),T (ψ)⊆ I;
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• M,wI |= ϕ ∨ψ iff M,wI |= ϕ or M,wI |= ψ with T (ϕ),T (ψ)⊆ I;
• M,wI |= ϕ → ψ iff M,wI 2 ϕ or M,wI |= ψ with T (ϕ),T (ψ)⊆ I;
• M,wI |= Bϕ iff ‖ ϕ ‖
M
wI
∈ N(wI) and T (ϕ)⊆ I;
• M,wI |= Kiϕ iff for all vI ∈ R(wI), it holds that M,vI |= ϕ and T (ϕ)⊆ I;
• M,wI |=Jϕ iff T (ϕ)⊆ J ⊆ I and for all vI ∈ R(wI), it holds that M,vI |= ϕ ;
In particular, considering formulas of the forms Bϕ and Kϕ , we observe that M,wI |= Bϕ if the set
‖ ϕ ‖MwI of worlds reachable from wI which entail ϕ in the very same model M belongs to the neigh-
bourhood N(wI) of wI . Hence, knowledge pertains to formulas entailed in model M in every reachable
world, while beliefs pertain to formulas entailed only in some set of them, where this set must however
belong to the neighbourhood and so it must be composed of reachable worlds. Thus, an agent is seen as
omniscient with respect to knowledge, but not with respect to beliefs.
Concerning a mental operation α performed by any agent i, we have: M,wI |= [α ]ϕ iff M
α ,wI |= ϕ
and T (ϕ) ⊆ I where Mα = 〈W ;Nα(wI);R;V ;T 〉 Here α represents a mental operation affecting the
sets of beliefs. In particular, such operation can add new beliefs by direct perception, by means of one
inference step, or as a conjunction of previous beliefs. When introducing new beliefs, the neighbourhood
must be extended accordingly, as seen below; in particular, the new neighbourhood Nα(wI) is defined
for each of the mental operations as follows.
• Learning perceived belief:
N+ϕ(wI) = N(wI) ∪
{
‖ ϕ ‖MwI
}
with T (ϕ)⊆ I.
The agent adds to its beliefs perception ϕ (namely, an atom or the negation of an atom) perceived
at a time in T (ϕ); the neighbourhood is expanded to as to include the set composed of all the
reachable worlds which entail ϕ in M.
• Beliefs conjunction:
N∩(ψ ,χ)(wI) =


N(wI) ∪
{
‖ ψ ∧ χ ‖MwI
}
if M,wI |= B(ψ)∧B(χ)
and T (∩(ψ ,χ))⊆ I
N(i,wI) otherwise
The agent adds ψ ∧χ as a belief if it has among its previous beliefs both ψ and χ , with I including
all time instants referred to by them; otherwise the set of beliefs remain unchanged. The neigh-
bourhood is expanded, if the operation succeeds, with those sets of reachable worlds where both
formulas are entailed inM.
• Belief inference:
N⊢(ψ ,χ)(wI) =


N(wI) ∪
{
‖ χ ‖MwI
}
if M,wI |= B(ψ) ∧ K(ψ → χ)
and T (⊢ (ψ ,χ))⊆ I
N(wI) otherwise
The agent adds the ground atom χ as a belief in its short-term memory if it has ψ among its previ-
ous beliefs and has in its background knowledge K(ψ → χ), where all the time stamps occurring
in ψ and in χ belong to I. Observe that, if I does not include all time instants involved in the
formulas, the operation does not succeed and thus the set of beliefs remains unchanged. If the
operation succeeds then the neighbourhood is modified by adding χ as a new belief.
• Beliefs revision (applied only on ground atoms):
Given Q = q( j,k) s.t. T (q( j,k)) = T (q(t1, t2))∩ T (q(t3, t4)) with j,k ∈ N and P =
{
M,wI |=
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B(p(t1, t2))∧B(q(t3, t4))∧K(p(t1, t2)→ ¬q(t3, t4)) and T (⊣ (p(t1, t2),q(t3, t4))) ⊆ I and there is
no interval J ) T (p(t1, t2)) s.t. B(q(t5, t6)) where T (q(t5, t6))=J
}
:
N⊣(p(t1,t2),q(t3,t4))(wI) =
{
N(wI)\
{
‖ Q ‖MwI
}
if P
N(i,wI) otherwise
The agent believes that q(t3, t4) holds only in the interval T (q(t3, t4)) and has the perception of
p(t1, t2) where T (p(t1, t2)) ⊆ T (q(t3, t4)). Then, the agent replaces previous belief q(t3, t4) in
the short-term memory with q(t5, t6) where T (q(t5, t6))=T (q(t3, t4)) \ T (q(t1, t2)). In general,
the set T (q(t3, t4)) \ T (q(t1, t2)) is not necessarily an interval: being T (p(t1, t2)) ⊆ T (q(t3, t4)),
with T (p(t1, t2))=[t1, t2], and T (q(t3, t4))=[t3, t4], we have that T (q(t3, t4)) \ T (q(t1, t2))=[t3, t1−
1]∪[t2+1, t4]. Thus, q(t3, t4) is replaced by q(t3, t1−1) and q(t2+1, t4) (and similarly if t4 = ∞).
We write |=T-DLEK ϕ to denote that ϕ is true in all worlds wI , of every TLEK model M.
Example 3: Let us consider the example of a person who is married or divorced, where s(he) can perform
the action to be married or divorced. Let us assume that performed actions are recorded among an agent’s
perceptions, with the due time stamp. For reader’s convenience, actions are denoted using a suffix “A”.
For simplicity, actions are supposed to always succeed and to produce an effect within one time instant.
Let us consider the following rules (kept in long-term memory):
K(marry(T,T)A→ married(T +1,∞))
K(divorce(T,T)A→ divorced(T +1,∞)).
Let us now assume that a person married, e.g., at time 5; then, a belief will be formed of the person is
married from time 6 on; however, if that person later divorced, e.g., at time 8, as a consequence result
that s(he) is divorced from time 9. It can be seen that the application of previous rules in consequence
of an agent’s action of marring/divorcing determines some “belief restructuring” in the short-term mem-
ory of the agent. In absence of other rules concerning marriage, we intend that a person can not be
simultaneously married and divorced. The related belief update is determined by the following rules:
K(married(T,∞)→¬divorced(T,∞))
K(divorced(T,∞)→¬married(T,∞))
With the above timing, the result of their application is that the belief formed at time 5, i.e.,married(6,∞)
will be replaced by married(6,8) plus divorced(9,∞).
Property 1: For the mental operations previously considered we have the following (where ϕ ,ψ are as
explained earlier):
• |=T-DLEK [+ϕ ]Bϕ .
Namely, as a consequence of the operation +ϕ (thus after the perception of ϕ) the agent i adds ϕ
to its beliefs.
• |=T-DLEK (Bϕ ∧Bψ)→ [∩(ϕ ,ψ)]B(ϕ ∧ψ).
Namely, if an agent has ϕ and ψ as beliefs, then as a consequence of the mental operation ∩(ϕ ,ψ)
the agent starts believing ϕ ∧ψ ;
• |=T-DLEK (K(ϕ → ψ)∧Bϕ)→ [⊢(ϕ ,ψ)]Bψ .
Namely, if an agent has ϕ as one of its beliefs and has K(ϕ→ψ) in its background knowledge,
then as a consequence of the mental operation ⊢(ϕ ,ψ) the agent starts believing ψ ;
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• |=T-DLEK (K(p(t1, t2)→¬q(t3, t4))∧B(p(t1, t2))∧B(q(t3, t4)))→ [⊣(p(t1, t2),q(t3, t4))]B(q(t5, t6))
where T (q(t5, t6)) = T (q(t3, t4))\T (q(t1, t2)).
Namely, if an agent has q(t3, t4) as one of its beliefs, q is not believed outside T (q(t3, t4)), the agent
perceives p(t1, t2) where T (p(t1, t2)) ⊆ T (q(t3, t4)), and has K(p(t1, t2)→ ¬q(t3, t4)) in its back-
ground knowledge. Then after the mental operation ⊣(p(t1, t2),q(t3, t4)) the agent starts believing
q(t5, t6)) where T (q(t5, t6)) = T (q(t3, t4))\T (q(t1, t2)).
3 Axiomatization and Canonical Models
The logic T-DLEK can be axiomatized as an extension of the axiomatization of DLEK as follows. We
implicitly assume modus ponens, standard axioms for classical propositional logic, and the necessitation
rule. The T-LEK axioms are the following:
1. K(ϕ)∧K(ϕ → ψ)→ K(ψ);
2. K(ϕ)→ ϕ ;
3. K(ϕ)→ KK(ϕ);
4. ¬K(ϕ)→ K¬K(ϕ);
5. Bϕ ∧K(ϕ ↔ ψ)→ Bψ .
The axiomatization of T-DLEK, involves these axioms:
1. [α ] f ↔ f where f = p or f = pt or f = pI ;
2. [α ]¬ϕ ↔¬[α ]ϕ ;
3. [α ](ϕ ∧ψ)↔ [α ]ϕ ∧ [α ]ψ ;
4. [α ]K(ϕ)↔ K
(
[α ](ϕ)
)
;
5. [+ϕ ]Bψ ↔
(
B([+ϕ ]ψ)∨K
(
[+ϕ ]ψ ↔ ϕ
))
;
6. [⊢(ϕ ,ψ)]Bχ ↔
(
B
(
[⊢(ϕ ,ψ)]χ
)
∨
(
Bϕ ∧K
(
ϕ → ψ
)
∧K
(
[⊣(ϕ ,ψ)]χ ↔ ψ
)))
;
7. [⊣(ϕ ,ψ)]Bχ ↔
(
B
(
[⊣(ϕ ,ψ)]χ
)
∨
(
Bϕ ∧K(ϕ→¬ψ)∧K
(
[⊣(ϕ ,ψ)]χ↔¬ψ
)))
;
8. [∩(ϕ ,ψ)]Bχ ↔
(
B
(
[∩(ϕ ,ψ)]χ
)
∨
(
(Bϕ ∧Bψ)∧ K
(
[∩(ϕ ,ψ)]χ ↔ (ϕ ∧ψ)
))
;
9.
ψ ↔ χ
ϕ ↔ ϕ [ψ/χ ]
where ϕ [ψ/χ ] denotes the formula obtained by replacing ψ with χ in ϕ .
We write T-DLEK ⊢ ϕ to indicate that ϕ is a theorem of TDLEK.
Both logics T-LEK and T-DLEK are sound for the class of T-LEK models. The proof that T-DLEK
is strongly complete can be achieved by using a standard canonical model argument.
The canonical T-LEK model is a tuple Mc = 〈Wc;Nc; {Rc;Vc;Tc〉 where:
• Wc is the set of all maximal consistent subsets of LT-LEK ; so, as in [2], canonical models are
constructed from worlds which are sets of syntactically correct formulas of the underlying lan-
guage and are in particular the largest consistent ones. As before, each w∈Wc can be conveniently
indicated as wI .
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• For every wI ∈W and wIRcvI if and only if Kϕ ∈ wI iff Kϕ ∈ vI ; i.e., Rc is an equivalence relation
on knowledge; as before, we define Rc(wI) = {vI ∈W |wIRcivI}. Thus, we cope with our extension
from knowledge of formulas to knowledge of formulas.
• Analogously to [2], for wI ∈W , Φ ∈LT-LEK we define AΦ(wI) = {vI ∈ Rc(wI) | Φ ∈ vI}. Then,
we put Nc(wI) = {AΦ(wI) | BΦ ∈ wI}.
• Vc is a valuation function defined as before.
• Tc is a “time” function defined as before.
As stated in Lemma 2 of [2], there are the following immediate consequences of the above definition:
if wI ∈Wc and i ∈ Ag, then
• for Φ ∈LT-LEK, it holds that KΦ ∈ wI if and only if ∀vI ∈W such that wIRcvI we have Φ ∈ vI ;
• for Φ ∈LT-LEK, if BΦ ∈ wI and wIRcvI then BΦ ∈ vI .
Thus, while Rc-related worlds have the same knowledge and Nc-related worlds have the same beliefs,
as stated in Lemma 3 of [2] there can be Rc-related worlds with different beliefs. The above properties
can be used analogously to what is done in [2] to prove that, by construction, the following results hold:
Lemma 3.1 For all wI ∈Wc and BiΦ,BiΨ ∈ LT-LEK , if BiΦ ∈ wI but BiΨ 6∈ wI , it follows that there
exists vI ∈ Rci(wI) such that Φ ∈ vI ↔ Ψ 6∈ vI .
Lemma 3.2 For all Φ ∈LT-LEK and wI ∈Wc it holds that Φ ∈ wI if and only if Mc,wI Φ.
Lemma 3.3 For all Φ ∈LT-DLEK then there exists Φ˜ ∈LT-LEK such that T-DLEK ⊢ Φ ↔ Φ˜.
Under the assumption that the interval I is finite, the previous lemmas allow us to prove the following
theorems. The limitation to finite intervals is not related to features of the proposed approach, but to
well-known paradoxes of temporal logics on infinite intervals.
Theorem 3.1 T-LEK is strongly complete for the class of T-LEK models.
Theorem 3.2 T-DLEK is strongly complete for the class of T-LEK models.
With the new formalization of time intervals proposed in this paper, the proof of the previous Theo-
rem immediately follows from the proof proposed in [2].
4 Conclusion
In this work we extended an existing approach to the logical modeling of short-term and long-term
memories in Intelligent Resource-Bounded Agents by introducing the T function, which manages the
interval when an atom is true. Through this function we are also able to assign a “timing” to the epistemic
operators B and K. Moreover we add the always operator I of the Metric Temporal Logic to increase
the expressiveness of our logic. We considered not just adding new beliefs, rather we introduced a
new mental operation not provided in DLEK, to allow for removing/restructuring existing beliefs. The
resulting T-DLEK logic shares similarities in the underlying principles with hybrid logics (cf., e.g., [1])
and with temporal epistemic logic (cf., e.g., [5]); as concerns the differences, the former has time instants
but no time intervals, and the latter has neither time instants nor time intervals.
With regard to complexity for the mono agent case for LEK it has been proved that the satisfiability
problem is decidable and it has been proved to be in NP-complete, instead for DLEK it has been con-
jectured to be PSPACE. It is easy to believe that our extensions cannot spoil decidability because the T
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function do not interfere. Inference steps to derive new beliefs are analogous to D-LEK: just one modal
rule at a time is used and a sharp separation is postulated between the working memory, where inference
is performed, and the long-term memory. We are working on the extension to the multi-agent case, also
reconsidering the complexity, and on the “Store” operation, which consist in managing the transition
from working memory to long term memory.
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